Smith On Externalism

Reading: Smith, The Externalist Challenge

(Note - there are two Smith readings in the coursepack. Take care to read the right one!)

1. What are the 3 definitions fo internalism Smith provides? How are they related?

2. What is externalism?

3. What is Brinks 'Amoralist' challenge?

4. How does Smith respond?

5. What is Foot's etiquette challenge?

6. How does Smith respond?

Railton on Realism

Reading: Railton, Moral Realism

Questions;

1. Is it possible to be serious about moraility without being a moral realist? What does Railton think? What do you think?

2. What is the position Railton calls "stark raving moral realism"?

3. What is the fact/vaule distinction?

4. Do moral staments express vaules or facts? What do you think? What does Railton think?

5.What is the Lonnie example (pg 174)? What is it supposed to show?

6. "Where is the place in explanation for facts about what OUGHT to be the case - dont facts about the way things ARE do all the explaining there is to be done?" pg 185. How would Railton respond to this type of question?

7. How could a notion of degrees of moral rightness participate in explanations of behavior? (pg 191 +)

8.What 3 patternms in the evolution of moral norms seem to bear out the predictions Railton makes? (pg 197 +)

Emotivism

Reading: The whole of the Miller

Questions:

1. Do you think that 'murder is wrong' expresses a fact? If yes, why so?

2. What is cognitivism? What is Ayer's version? What would they say in response to question 2?

3. What is logical positivism? How would this lead to an arugment against Moore?

4. What does it mean to say that 'murder is wrong' is an expression, not a saying (see pg 37)?

5. What is the implied error problem?

6. What is the Frege Geach problem? Think of your own example of the syllogism on pg 40-41 (staments 8 and 9 leading to 10). Is your example an example of a valid arugment? How often do we reason like this in everyday life?

7. What is Blackburn's response to the Frege Geach problem?

8. Why does Wright think Blackburn's response doesnt work?

9. What is commitment theoretic semamtics?

Mackie on Subjective Vaules

Again, a short reading this week, so try to get really clear about what is being said.

Reading: Chapter 1, Section 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9 of the Mackie Reading (in the coursepack)

Questions:

1. What is Mackie's thesis re:objective vaules? What does he take them to include? How intially appealing do you find this thesis?

2. Whats the 1st order/2nd order distinction? (pg 16)

3. What is the 1st 2nd order type of subjectivism mentioned in section 2? How does Mackie's view differ?

4. Whats the arugment from relativity?

5. Why can it not be that "the mere occurence of disagreements ... tells against the objectivity of vaules"?

6. What is Sidgwick's objection?

7. What is the response to Sidgwick?

8. What are the two parts to the argument fro queerness?

9. Whats intuitionism? Why is the objectivist committed to it? Is this a bad thing for the objectivist?

10. Whats Price's response to the queerness argument?

Rule Following

Main reading: Kripke, sections in the coursepack

Additional: Please make sure you understand the three responses mentioned below (Kripke's own, dispositional, and Boghossian's). If you do not, the Boghossian paper is very useful.

Questions:

1. What does Kripke say it is to grasp a rule?

2. What is the sceptic's hypothesis re: plus and quss?

3. What are the 2 forms of the challenge on pg 11? Which do you think is stronger?

4. What is the differene between Quine and Wittgenstien discussed on pg 14?

5. Pn pg 15 Kripke takes it that a finite number of examples is not enough to fix the meaning. Why?

6. Why does the rule suggested on pg 16 not fix this problem?

7. What is the dispotional response? What are its problems?

8. What is Kripke's own response? (From the lecture notes)

9. What is Boghossian's response? (From the lecture notes/additonal reading)

Fictional Characters

Reading: Chaphter 12 of Brock and Mares

Questions:
1. What 2 theses do realist subscribe to? Do you find the objectivity thesis initally plausable? If you dont, what arugments can you think of against it?

2.What is the difference between a fictional statment and a critical statment? Which do Brock and Mares find provides the best "common sense opinion" in support of realism, and why? Are there any other "commmon sense" opinions you have which DONT support realism about fictional charachters?

3. Why think that critical staments cannot be considered abbreveations?

4. Why think that they can? If only some of them can, what would that show?

5. Whats an example of a negative existential which seems true but the realist will have to deny?

6. What arugment ( on pg 207) can the realist put against the stament in question 5 being true?

7. Whats the difference between concrete and abstract realism? What are the different ways they would deal with the stament from question 5?

8. What is Thomasson's theory? Why does she hold it?

9. Whats prefix fictionalism?

10. Do we assert fictional staments? Who would deny that we do? How and why would they make this move?

Colour

Reading: Chapter 7 of the Brock and Mares

1. What things do you want to be a realist about? What things do you want to be anti realist about? Where does colour fit in?

2. What do error theorists about colour claim?

3. What is Democritus' argument for error theory?

4. What are the 2 versions of compostionality on pg 98? Is either plausable?

5. Is it possible to eliminate colour talk from our language? What are the consequences if we can/cannot?

6. What is physicalism?

7. Why might you want to endorse physicalism? Why might you not?

8. What is response dependence? How would they define 'redness'?

9. What problems does the response dependence theorist face?

10. Whats non reductive realism?

11. Whats Hardin's objection?

Deflationism

1. In your opinion is there any difference in meaning between ‘snow is white’ and ‘it is true that snow is white’? What would Ramsey say?

2. What do Bar –On and Simmons say is the “core metaphysical claim” shared by deflationists? What does it mean?

3. If truth is deflated, then do we need the truth predicate at all? In what ways is it useful? How would a deflationist account for these?

4. On pg 239 of Horwich he says (of other accounts of truth) “nothing of this sort has ever survived serious scrutiny”. Do you agree? What rests on this claim?

5. What is the truth schema? What is the deflationists claim about it?

6. What does it mean to say truth is a property? Does redundancy theory say truth is a property? Why/why not?

7. Horwich distinguishes between different notions of property. What are the different notions? Do you think there is a real distinction here?

8. What is Boghossian’s argument against deflationism? How does Horwich argue against it?

9. What is Wright’s objection to deflationism?

10. Which do find more convincing, correspondence or deflationism?

test

Correspondence Theory Of Truth

Correspondence Theory Of Truth

Seminar 1: 17/10/2011

Reading: First two readings in the course pack, Engel, P.
Truth pages 9 - 26 and Kirkham Chaphter 4

Questions:

Before the seminar, please consider the below questions. You do not need to write the answers down (though of course you can if that helps you) but please take some time to think about them. If you cant answer the below (especially the first few) then you probably havent understood the reading. It might be helpful to do it again slowly, focusing on the questions, email me, or turn up at the seminar with specific issues/questions I can help you with.

1. If I say A; 'that dog is a true Irish setter', and B; 'is it true that snow is white', am I using 'true' in the same sense in both A and B? If there is a difference, what is the difference (see pg 9)? Which usage is the one that we will be discussing in the seminar?

2. What is a truth bearer? What is a truth maker? Whats the realtionship between the two?

3. What does it mean to say that a theory of truth is a realist theory of truth? What, in general, makes a theory of X a realist theory of X?


4. What are some of the candidates for what a truth maker is? (pg 11 of Engel) Which do you find convincing?

5. Does Frege think we can define truth? Why/why not? What do you think?

8. What are the two types of correspondance mentioned on pg 119 of Kirkham? Which applies to Russell?

6. What does Russell in Problems of Philosophy argue is the right conception of truth? What are the two difficulties noted on pg 19-20 of Engel with this view?

7. In what ways does Wittgenstiens position (pg 20 of Engel) agree with Russell's? In what ways do they differ? Who do you think is right?

9. What about Austin's view (pg 124 of Kirkham)?

10. Can you think of some general virtues of a realists theories? Do these virtues hold of Russell/Wittgenstein/Austin re:truth? What about some potential vices of realism in general?