2. What do Bar –On and Simmons say is the “core metaphysical claim” shared by deflationists? What does it mean?
3. If truth is deflated, then do we need the truth predicate at all? In what ways is it useful? How would a deflationist account for these?
4. On pg 239 of Horwich he says (of other accounts of truth) “nothing of this sort has ever survived serious scrutiny”. Do you agree? What rests on this claim?
5. What is the truth schema? What is the deflationists claim about it?
6. What does it mean to say truth is a property? Does redundancy theory say truth is a property? Why/why not?
7. Horwich distinguishes between different notions of property. What are the different notions? Do you think there is a real distinction here?
8. What is Boghossian’s argument against deflationism? How does Horwich argue against it?
9. What is Wright’s objection to deflationism?
10. Which do find more convincing, correspondence or deflationism?