Friday 28 October 2011

Colour

Reading: Chapter 7 of the Brock and Mares

1. What things do you want to be a realist about? What things do you want to be anti realist about? Where does colour fit in?

2. What do error theorists about colour claim?

3. What is Democritus' argument for error theory?

4. What are the 2 versions of compostionality on pg 98? Is either plausable?

5. Is it possible to eliminate colour talk from our language? What are the consequences if we can/cannot?

6. What is physicalism?

7. Why might you want to endorse physicalism? Why might you not?

8. What is response dependence? How would they define 'redness'?

9. What problems does the response dependence theorist face?

10. Whats non reductive realism?

11. Whats Hardin's objection?

Deflationism

1. In your opinion is there any difference in meaning between ‘snow is white’ and ‘it is true that snow is white’? What would Ramsey say?

2. What do Bar –On and Simmons say is the “core metaphysical claim” shared by deflationists? What does it mean?

3. If truth is deflated, then do we need the truth predicate at all? In what ways is it useful? How would a deflationist account for these?

4. On pg 239 of Horwich he says (of other accounts of truth) “nothing of this sort has ever survived serious scrutiny”. Do you agree? What rests on this claim?

5. What is the truth schema? What is the deflationists claim about it?

6. What does it mean to say truth is a property? Does redundancy theory say truth is a property? Why/why not?

7. Horwich distinguishes between different notions of property. What are the different notions? Do you think there is a real distinction here?

8. What is Boghossian’s argument against deflationism? How does Horwich argue against it?

9. What is Wright’s objection to deflationism?

10. Which do find more convincing, correspondence or deflationism?

Thursday 13 October 2011

Correspondence Theory Of Truth

Correspondence Theory Of Truth

Seminar 1: 17/10/2011

Reading: First two readings in the course pack, Engel, P.
Truth pages 9 - 26 and Kirkham Chaphter 4

Questions:

Before the seminar, please consider the below questions. You do not need to write the answers down (though of course you can if that helps you) but please take some time to think about them. If you cant answer the below (especially the first few) then you probably havent understood the reading. It might be helpful to do it again slowly, focusing on the questions, email me, or turn up at the seminar with specific issues/questions I can help you with.

1. If I say A; 'that dog is a true Irish setter', and B; 'is it true that snow is white', am I using 'true' in the same sense in both A and B? If there is a difference, what is the difference (see pg 9)? Which usage is the one that we will be discussing in the seminar?

2. What is a truth bearer? What is a truth maker? Whats the realtionship between the two?

3. What does it mean to say that a theory of truth is a realist theory of truth? What, in general, makes a theory of X a realist theory of X?


4. What are some of the candidates for what a truth maker is? (pg 11 of Engel) Which do you find convincing?

5. Does Frege think we can define truth? Why/why not? What do you think?

8. What are the two types of correspondance mentioned on pg 119 of Kirkham? Which applies to Russell?

6. What does Russell in Problems of Philosophy argue is the right conception of truth? What are the two difficulties noted on pg 19-20 of Engel with this view?

7. In what ways does Wittgenstiens position (pg 20 of Engel) agree with Russell's? In what ways do they differ? Who do you think is right?

9. What about Austin's view (pg 124 of Kirkham)?

10. Can you think of some general virtues of a realists theories? Do these virtues hold of Russell/Wittgenstein/Austin re:truth? What about some potential vices of realism in general?